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I would like to discuss the ideological significance of this presenta-
tion. In his extremely brilliant paper, Professor Gordon describes
legal history as essentially destabilizing and subversive, and I agree
with him. Yet it is clear that legal history has not always served this
function. Thus, I would like to focus briefly on the origin of the de-
stabilizing and subversive character of legal history.
By and large, the dominant tradition in Anglo-American legal schol-
arship today is unhistorical. It attempts to find universal rationalizing
principles. For those of you who are law students and may not be
familiar with the dominant form of legal scholarship, you need only
imagine your first year law school classes in order to get a quick
picture of legal scholarship "writ small." The underlying structure
of the law class remains that of forcing the student to reconcile con-
tradictions that cannot be reconciled. If you do it very well, you then
become a professor and you demand it of your students and you
continue to do it in your legal scholarship. The ideological "tilt" of
current legal scholarship derives from this attempt to suppress the real
contradictions in the world, to make the existing world seem to be
necessary, to be "immanent" as Professor Gordon calls it, to seem
to be part of the nature of things. It is history that comes to challenge
this approach by showing that the rationalizing principles of the main-
stream scholars are historically contingent. Consequently, analytic
scholarship is anti-historical: it regards history as subversive because
it exposes the rationalizing enterprise.
Nevertheless, it is, I think, an historically contingent matter even
that history should be subversive. It wasn't always this way. If you
looked back and asked how people apologized for the world in 1700,
you would certainly say that it was through a customary theory of
law. The justification was historical: Matthew Hale's evolutionary
notion of law was designed to show that existing legal institutions
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and doctrines would regularly reach higher and higher forms of per-
fection. Blackstone incorporated Hale's Whiggish views into his own
Commentaries.1 If you looked at the function of history in 1800, you
would turn to Edmund Burke. Notwithstanding Burke's early reform-
ism, his use of history was basically apologetic.2 Indeed, until 1900,
in the Anglo-American world at least, legal history was tied to various
forms of evolutionism and Social Darwinism. All of the legal history
done at the Harvard Law School at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury by Langdell and Ames and others was essentially apologetic in
nature.3 They tried to show that you could trace any current doc-
trine back to Adam and Eve through a process of natural growth.
Some time around 1900 or thereafter, the situation that Professor
Gordon focuses on really did emerge. The universalizing and ra-
tionalizing tendency of the analytic tradition came to be fundamen-
tally apologetic, and the historicist tradition turned to showing the
historical contingency of the claims of the analytic tradition. If we
look at the 1920s and 1930s, we find a powerful example of the use
of legal history in order to delegitimate a system of thought. Pro-
gressives and legal realists used history to show the historical con-
tingency of supposedly universal rules and doctrines. They showed,
for example, that the rule of caveat emptor was not necessary and
natural and that many fundamental changes in legal doctrine had
occurred with the shifts from medieval to modern times or from feu-
dalism to capitalism. 4 They thus sought to undermine the claims of
previous systems to universality. For the first time, I think, legal his-
tory performed an essentially destabilizing and subversive function.
By 1940 or 1950, I think, this role was quite clear and dominant. So
we now have two radically different styles of scholarship.
History came to be subversive at just the moment when, for rea-
sons that are difficult and obscure, the analytic tradition committed
itself to the suppression of contradiction-to the basic attempt to recon-
cile the irreconcilable by showing that X and not X can exist at the
same time, which is essential to demonstrating that an unjust social
order is capable of being rational. The interesting and difficult ques-
tion, the really complicated question of historical explanation, is:
Why did this particular form of rationalizing analytic scholarship
come, by 1900, to represent the dominant apologetic mode of thought?
Why, in turn, was history given up as a mode of apology?
I. See Gordon, Historicism in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1017, 1029 (1981).
2. See id. at 1030.
3. See id. at 1028, 1036, 1045.
4. See id. at 1034, 1042-43.
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Now, I don't know the answer and I don't have time to work it
through, but I'd like to make some suggestions. The collapse of aris-
tocratic, status-based societies after the English and French Revolu-
tions seems to have pushed liberal thought away from custom and
history, forcing it to create universal systems of thought based on the
formal equality of individuals. It may be the advent of Marxism in
the middle of the nineteenth century that made liberalism defend
itself through unhistorical universalism. Certainly, the rise of profes-
sionalism at the end of the nineteenth century can be associated with
the search for universal norms in an effort to emulate the supposed
methods of the natural sciences. The one thing that does seem clear
is that the situation that Professor Gordon has so brilliantly described
raises basic questions concerning the political and ideological charac-
ter of legal scholarship in this century.
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